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I. INTRODUCTION

At its heart, the law of personal jurisdiction is simple and elegant.
It is premised on two fundamental concepts that together establish the
core of due process: connecting factors and reasonable expectations.1
More specifically, to properly establish personal jurisdiction, connecting
factors must link the defendant to the forum under circumstances that
should invest the defendant with a reasonable expectation of being sued
there.
Yet, despite this simple elegance, the United States Supreme Court
has proven incapable of providing a coherent vision of the law of
personal jurisdiction. In essence, the Court’s fact-specific, case-by-case
approach has produced an ever-widening doctrinal morass. As a
consequence, the fundamental principles have been submerged beneath
mechanistic formulas that are both too broad and too narrow and that, all
too often, are open to subjective interpretations and applications.
Moreover, the various “tests” are sometimes redundant in that they
endorse alternative case-specific formulas that could easily be reduced to
one test.
After carefully considering and critiquing the current body of

1. In my view, the due process standards of personal jurisdiction are not the proper vehicle
through which to address questions of sovereignty or state power. Due process pertains to liberty,
not to sovereignty. The sole constitutional issue in that context is whether a state could rationally
conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction over a particular set of facts might rationally advance its
interest in the protection of the health, safety, or welfare of its constituents. The sovereignty and
liberty questions may be related, but they are not the same. In fact, the Court has made it clear that
there was no independent sovereignty analysis in the determination of whether personal jurisdiction
would be consistent with due process. See Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do
with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729 (2012).
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jurisdictional doctrine, this Article suggests a return to fundamental
principles.2 To that end, I propose that the law of personal jurisdiction
be codified in a statute that says more than “conform to due process” but
does not resemble a highly formalistic, tailored long-arm statute.
Rather, my proposed statute defines due process in a manner that
captures the essence of personal jurisdiction at a principled level,
providing a durable standard capable of application across a wide range
of cases. Thus, the statute avoids the “mechanistic and ‘transcendental
nonsense’ of legal formalism,”3 while offering effective guidance to the
courts that would apply the statute. As such, the statute invites results
that are premised on “predictable and nonsubjective conclusions.”4
Of course, all statutes are subject to judicial interpretation and the
power of judicial review. That combination puts any statutory text at
risk. Hence, my goal is not simply to propose a model statute but also to
lay the foundation for a different way of thinking about the law of
personal jurisdiction. In other words, my goal is to turn the Supreme
Court back to the fundamental principles of due process.
The dominant academic view of the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence is that it constitutes a body of decisions that
have progressively fined-tuned the relevant doctrine through a selfcorrecting process of trial and error.5 Scholarship tends to work around
the edges of this process. Thus, there is a body of literature that attempts
to organize the developed doctrine into useful subcategories;6 another
2. For a discussion of my theoretical approach to procedure, see Simona Grossi, A Modified
Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of Arising-Under Jurisdiction, 88 WASH. L. REV.
961 (2013).
3. Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement, Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and
Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2010).
4. Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1085, 1090 (1995).
5. See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1067.1 (3d. ed. 2013) (offering a positive narrative of the Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 133-46 (4th ed. 1999) (describing the Court’s refinement of the International Shoe
standard) (hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE). But see Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the
Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753 (2003) (arguing for the abandonment of
the International Shoe minimum contacts test).
6. See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-53 (1966) (drawing a distinction between general
and specific jurisdiction); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
610 (1988) (endorsing a more careful consideration of the distinction between general and specific
jurisdiction); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General Jurisdiction,
or Specific Jurisdiction, But Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559 (1998) (noting the
emergence of a form of jurisdiction that is a “hybrid” of the general and specific categories). See
also Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999
(2012) (assessing the current status of general jurisdiction).
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that argues in favor of or against various doctrinal developments;7 and
still another that focuses its attention on potential novel applications of
established doctrine to emerging economic and social trends.8 This
scholarly endeavor is valuable indeed, in that it contributes to a better
understanding of the courts’ overall approach to the law of personal
jurisdiction, thereby giving guidance to the legal profession and the
scholarly community. I do something different. My goal is not to
categorize, critique, or refine existing doctrine, but to challenge the idea
that the Supreme Court’s case-by-case approach to personal jurisdiction
represents an arc of progress. In my view, all too often the Court’s
apparent refinements operate as detours from the fundamental principles
at stake. The result is a clutter of doctrinal tests that is inconsistent with
principle and confuses more than it informs.
In Part II, I briefly explore the traditional bases of jurisdiction and
the Court’s elaboration of the minimum contacts test in International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.9 Here, I show that both the traditional
and minimum contacts approaches are premised largely on the existence
of connecting factors and reasonable expectations. In short, each form
operates (with one exception) from the perspective of fundamental
principles unadorned by doctrinal explication. Part III shows how the
Court’s post-International Shoe jurisprudence has elevated fact-driven
and case-specific doctrine over the underlying fundamental principles.
This phenomenon is particularly apparent with respect to the purposeful
availment requirement and with the standards applied to the stream-ofcommerce and effects tests. Here, I also examine some of the resulting
confusion in lower courts. Part IV offers and defends a model statute
that is designed to return personal jurisdiction to a fundamental7. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1163 (2013) (critique on the current direction of doctrinal development); Allan Ides, A Critical
Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 341 (2012) (critique of the Court’s stream of commerce decisions); Robin J. Effron,
Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal
Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867 (2012) (same); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of
Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010) (criticizing the Court for its lack of
guidance as to the timeframe within which minimum contacts should be analyzed); Mona A. Lee,
Burger King’s Bifurcated Test for Personal Jurisdiction: The Reasonableness Inquiry Impedes
Judicial Economy and Threatens a Defendant’s Due Process Rights, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 945 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the Wrong Target: The “Audience Targeting”
Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541 (2012); Megan
M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 43 (2010); Veronica M. Sanchez, Taking a Byte Out of Minimum Contacts: A Reasonable
Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1671
(1999).
9. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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principles approach shorn of restrictive and redundant doctrine. Part V
offers concluding remarks.
II. JURISDICTION PREMISED ON CONNECTING FACTORS AND
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The standards of personal jurisdiction have been shaped primarily
by decisions of the Supreme Court.10 Those decisions recognize two
broad categories of circumstances under which jurisdiction may be
exercised consistently with due process. The first category includes
those exercises of jurisdiction that can be described as traditional,
tracing their origins to at least the late nineteenth century. The second
category includes those exercises of jurisdiction that fall within the
general contours of the “minimum contacts” test.
A. The Traditional Category
The traditional bases of personal jurisdiction include domicile,
voluntary appearance, consent to service of process, and physical
presence. Each of these forms is consistent with the sovereignty
principle announced in Pennoyer v. Neff.11 There, the Court saw due
process as reflecting a principle of “territoriality” under which a state
had complete jurisdictional dominion within its territory but virtually
none beyond its borders (with some exceptions).12 When jurisdiction is
asserted on one of these traditional bases—that were widely recognized
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868—it
categorically satisfies due process.13
Territoriality aside, another way to describe the traditional bases is
as a reflection of connecting factors and expectations that make the
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable (and hence consistent with due
process). The fit is not perfect, as we will see, but the parallels are
significant. Thus, one’s status as a domiciliary can be seen as a
connecting factor that creates a reasonable expectation of being subject
to suit within the state of domicile given the tangible and intangible
benefits that flow from citizenship. Essentially, a domiciliary has
consented to the jurisdictional authority of the state in which he is
10. See generally ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROCEDURE 53-200 (4th ed. 2012); Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story of
Comparative Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-17 (1993).
11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
12. Id. at 722.
13. IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 66-76.
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domiciled. Similarly, a person who has voluntarily appeared in court or
contractually consented to jurisdiction within the forum has, by so
acting, created a connecting factor that leads inexorably to a reasonable
expectation of forum-based jurisdiction.
The fit is not quite as comfortable with respect to persons or
property found within the forum. Although this form of jurisdiction is
premised on a rather obvious geographic connection with the forum, it is
not equally obvious that the connection universally creates (or ought to
be seen as creating) a reasonable expectation of jurisdiction within the
forum.14 One could argue that physical presence in the forum creates an
expectation of jurisdiction based on Pennoyer’s territoriality principle.
But that is a circular argument in which due process is dependent on a
legal abstraction. Certainly, an expectation of jurisdiction is not an
inherent characteristic of one’s temporary presence within the territory
(or from the fact that property is temporarily located within the
jurisdiction). The “reasonableness” of any such expectation might well
depend on the nature of the presence and the relationship between that
presence and the claim asserted.
In sum, certain traditional forms of jurisdiction, although based on a
sovereignty principle, can be seen as reflective of the due process
principles of connecting factors and reasonable expectations. Domicile,
voluntary appearance, and consent all fall into this category. On the
other hand, the category of persons or property found within the
jurisdiction, at least when applied rigidly, may be inconsistent with the
reasonable expectation principle.
B. Tradition Extended—Minimum Contacts
Whenever a defendant is sued in a place other than his domicile and
whenever jurisdiction cannot be established on some other traditional
bases, due process requires that there must be some indication that the
defendant was otherwise on reasonable notice of the possibility of being
sued there. Reasonable notice can be established either because he
performed activities in that state or because his contacts with the state
are such that the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of that state does not
come as an unfair surprise to him. More specifically, in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,15 the Supreme Court held that “due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
14.
15.

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977).
Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’”16
While International Shoe did not overrule Pennoyer, it did adopt a
model of due process that is premised less on sovereignty than it is on
the connecting factors that make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
To state the matter very generally, under the minimum contacts test,
states would be allowed to reach out beyond their territorial limits when
connecting factors make it fair and reasonable to do so. Thus, under the
minimum contacts test, a nonresident defendant must have directed her
conduct toward the forum state, for example, by engaging in activities
there,17 entering into contracts with residents of the forum state,18
marketing or selling a dangerous or defective product there,19 or causing
an effect there.20 In addition, the activities or contacts with the state
must be related to the claim (specific jurisdiction)21 or be so
“continuous, substantial and systematic” that it is as if the nonresident
defendant were “at home” there (general jurisdiction).22 If these
standards are satisfied, the exercise of jurisdiction is presumed to be
reasonable, i.e., it is consistent with due process. A nonresident
defendant may, however, rebut that presumption by a strong showing to
the contrary.23
16. Id. at 316 (second emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
17. Id. at 317.
18. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985).
19. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298
(1980).
20. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
21. See Nowak v. Tak How Inv. Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D. Mass. 1995).
22. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1952). One can see general jurisdiction as an extension of the
traditional basis of jurisdiction premised on domicile. In essence, the principle that jurisdiction is
proper in the place of the defendant’s domicile is expanded to say that, even when individuals or
corporations are not formally “domiciled” in a state, if their activity there is continuous, substantial,
and systematic, they may still be treated as if they were domiciled in that state, and the court may
exercise general jurisdiction over them. Doing extensive activity in the forum state, however, is not
considered a traditional basis of personal jurisdiction that, as such, does not require any fact-specific
scrutiny to establish its consistency with due process and, therefore, its validity. A fact-specific
analysis will always be required to find that, indeed, the activity done in the forum state is extensive
and, by its very nature, a contact that should put the defendant on notice of the possibility of being
haled into court there on any cause of action.
23. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115-16; Nowak, 899 F. Supp. at 33. In Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134
S.Ct. 746, 762 n.19 (2014), a majority of the Court ruled that the “second step” reasonableness
inquiry is superfluous in once the standards for general jurisdiction have been satisfied.
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We can see then that both the traditional bases for asserting
jurisdiction and the minimum contacts test share a salient characteristic
in common—namely, they are both based on connecting factors that
give rise to a reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum.
*****
Since the decision in International Shoe, which focused more on
fundamental principles than it did on the niceties of doctrine, the
Supreme Court has gradually but steadily moved toward a technical and
specialized approach to the law of personal jurisdiction,24, such that we
can now think in terms of categories and subcategories of problems:
activities in the forum, contracts with forum residents, tortious effects in
the state, products liability cases, internet cases and so forth. To put it
differently, the Court in International Shoe endorsed fundamental
principles discovered in the case law from a somewhat removed
perspective, and it described those fundamental principles in broad and
nontechnical terms. Since International Shoe, however, the Court has
moved from the fundamental principles approach to a form of line
drawing that one might expect to find in an ever-morphing code. As will
be discussed below, rather than serving the fundamental principles of
due process, this fragmented, piecemeal discipline has often resulted in a
disservice of the basic principles it sought to further.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
A. The Ascendance of Doctrine
What came in the wake of International Shoe was a process of
redirecting the fundamental principles approach into more specific
doctrinal categories. Some of that process has been informative as to the
basic reach of the model, and respectful of its fundamental principles.
Other parts of the redirecting process, however, seem to have elevated
doctrine over those principles, or at least have insinuated doctrine
between the fundamental principles and the facts.
1. Fundamental Principles Adrift: McGee and Hansen
In its October 1957 term, the Supreme Court decided two personal

24. See IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 90-150 (providing the opinions of major cases
discussed in this paper and a short commentary on how the Court’s opinions have changed from
case to case).
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jurisdiction cases, one of which might be characterized as informative
but unnecessary, while the other may have begun the drift away from the
fundamental-principles approach established in International Shoe. The
first, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,25 involved a suit to
enforce the provisions of a life insurance policy. The facts were simple.
An insurance company from Texas solicited a reinsurance agreement
with a resident of California via mail. The offer was accepted in
California, and the insurance premiums were mailed from California to
Texas, until the insured died. His mother, the beneficiary under the
policy, filed a claim with the insurance company, but the company
refused to pay. She then sued the company in a California state court,
which upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the insurance
company and eventually entered a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.
When the mother sought to enforce that judgment in Texas, however,
Texas courts refused to give it full faith and credit on the theory that the
California courts lacked jurisdiction over the Texas company.26
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether a single
contact with the forum—the solicitation of one policy—could serve as a
proper basis on which to exercise personal jurisdiction.27 In fact, the
Court in International Shoe had already given this question an
affirmative response when it observed that a single act could be “deemed
sufficient” to establish jurisdiction depending on the “nature and quality
and the circumstances of [its] commission.”28 With that principle having
been established, there was little more the Supreme Court needed to say
about it. In upholding the California courts’ exercise of personal
jurisdiction, the Court explained, “[W]e think it apparent that the Due
Process Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a
judgment binding on respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State.”29
In so ruling, the McGee Court did no more than conform its
judgment to the fundamentals of due process announced in International
Shoe. The essence of the ruling was that the insurance company’s
solicitation of a contract in California established a connecting factor
with that state and created a reasonable expectation in the insurance
25. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
26. Id. at 221.
27. Id. at 223.
28. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)).
29. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
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company that it might be sued in California for breach of that contract.
Thus, the Court’s decision did not articulate any new doctrine. Rather, it
policed the application of established principles and reiterated them for
the guidance of lower courts. One might criticize the Court for being too
engaged in correcting case-specific errors, but one could also say that its
opinion served as a useful reminder of the fundamental principles
established twelve years earlier in International Shoe.
Six months after the decision in McGee, the Court returned to
personal jurisdiction in Hanson v. Denckla30 to specify that a plaintiff’s
unilateral contacts with the forum are not relevant for purposes of
establishing personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. But was
that really necessary? And was that actually the issue presented to the
Court? As to the first question, the Court in International Shoe had
made it clear that it is the defendant’s contacts alone that are relevant to
the minimum contacts analysis.31 As to the second question, the
essential issue in Hanson was whether the courts of Florida could
exercise jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee of a trust whose settlor had
moved to Florida after the creation of the trust.32 The trustee continued
to administer the trust on behalf of the Florida settlor for the following
eight years. And the settlor exercised the power of appointment under
the trust while in Florida. Still, the Court found that the trustee lacked
minimum contacts with Florida sufficient to allow personal
jurisdiction.33 The Court, relying on International Shoe, described the
due process standard as follows: “it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits of protections of its laws.”34 Thus, the Court transformed
what International Shoe had considered a natural consequence of a
defendant’s activities in a state—i.e., enjoying the benefits and
protections of the laws of that state—into a necessary pre-condition for
the exercise of jurisdiction. This is a clear example of the Court falling
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31. In International Shoe, the Court had, in fact, already stated that:
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons
or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’ Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (emphasis added).
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
32. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 243-44.
33. Id. at 251.
34. Id. at 253.
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into a linguistic doctrinal trap.35
In applying the new “purposeful-availment” test, the Court
distinguished McGee by noting that, unlike the insurance company there,
the trustee here had not performed any acts in the forum state that bore
the same relationship to the trust as did the solicitation of the insurance
contract at issue in McGee.36 In fact, in the Court’s view, the Florida
proceeding could not be considered as one initiated to enforce an
obligation arising from any privilege the nonresident defendant trustee
had exercised in Florida.37 Thus, according to the Court, the trustee had
not “purposefully availed” itself of the benefits and protections of
Florida law.38 Of course, as noted above, this purposeful-availment
requirement was a product of the Hanson Court’s own creation and,
most importantly, it was not an absolute precondition to making the
exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.
Even if the Florida courts’ judgment may have made it necessary
for the Court to clarify the minimum contacts standards, in doing so, the
Court unfortunately did just the opposite by creating confusion over the
nature of the contacts that would qualify as meaningful. It is certainly
not true that the trust company lacked meaningful connections with the
state. Nor is it necessarily the case that the company could not have
reasonably expected to be sued in Florida on a matter related to the trust.
After all, the company was aware that the settlor had moved to Florida
and continued to act as the trustee over the trust and to communicate
with her in Florida with respect to trust business.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that Florida had
personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.39 He observed that the
object of the controversy was whether the settlor had properly exercised
her power to appoint beneficiaries under the precise trust being
administered by the trustee. In fact, the litigation arose when the
legatees, under the settlor’s will, brought an action in the Florida courts
seeking a determination as to whether this appointment was valid.40
This disposition of her property had very close and substantial
connections with Florida, since the settlor had appointed the
beneficiaries in Florida and all of the beneficiaries lived there. Thus,

35. See Allan Ides & Simona Grossi, The Purposeful Availment Trap, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV.
118 (2013).
36. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-52.
37. Id. at 252.
38. Id. at 253.
39. Id. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 258.
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Florida had an interest in exercising jurisdiction and applying Florida
law to determine whether the appointment was indeed valid. The
connections between the appointment, the transaction, and the State of
Florida were thus evident and, of course, the trustee was necessarily
implicated in this action. Therefore, in Justice Black’s view, Florida
courts should have the power to adjudicate a controversy arising out of
transactions that were so connected to the state, unless litigation there
would impose such a heavy and disproportionate burden on a
nonresident defendant that it would offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”41 But, according to Justice Black, that was
not case, since the trustee “chose to maintain business relations with [the
settlor] in that State for eight years, regularly communicating with her
with respect to the business of the trust including the very appointment
in question.”42 Moreover, the trustee’s burden of participating as a
formal (and collateral) party to this dispute over the appointment would
have been minimal at best.
Justice Black’s conclusion seems more consistent with
International Shoe and the rationale behind the jurisdictional formula the
Court there endorsed—a formula that considers the meaningful contacts
of the nonresident defendant with the forum and that seeks to ensure that
the exercise of jurisdiction does not come as an unfair surprise to the
defendant. In other words, Justice Black was willing to attend to all of
the connecting factors and expectations of the parties, while the
majority, with its myopic focus on “purposeful availment,” was not.
With the decision in Hanson, we see the beginning of a shift away
from the fundamental principles that animated the decision in
International Shoe toward a more technical and mechanistic approach to
the details of doctrine.43 With Hanson, the minimum contacts test began
to lose its inherent coherence and strength.
2. Fundamental Principles Altered: Burger King and Asahi
At issue in Burger King v. Rudzewicz44 was whether a federal court
sitting in Florida could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
franchisee that had entered into a long-term franchise agreement with the
plaintiff, a corporate resident of the state. The bulk of the Court’s
opinion focused on the purposeful availment requirement, but the Court
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 259.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-59 (1958).
Id. at 253.
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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added a potential “exit” to the jurisdictional analysis under which a
strong presumption of jurisdiction established by the connecting factors
and the reasonable expectation arising of those factors could be rebutted
under “compelling” circumstances.45 In describing this standard the
Court suggested that it would apply only when the defendant established
“the unconstitutionality of” the exercise of jurisdiction by showing a
severe impairment of the defendant’s ability to defend or assert a
counterclaim.46 The Court’s application of this additional consideration
essentially replicated forum non conveniens analysis, strongly suggesting
this element’s redundancy.47 The Court concluded, however, that the
heavy presumption in favor of jurisdiction was not rebutted in the case
before it.48
Two years later, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,49 a
case that involved the enforcement of an indemnification agreement
between two foreign entities, the Court applied the “unreasonableness”
exit. In concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable, the Court balanced the interests of the forum, the interest
of the U.S. judicial system, potential foreign policy considerations, and
the interests of the parties,50 Again, the Court’s analysis sounded more
like a forum non conveniens analysis than one that focused on the basics
of personal jurisdiction, that is, an analysis premised on connecting
factors and reasonable expectations.51 Nor did the Court’s analysis in
Asahi suggest that there was any fundamental unfairness in the exercise
of jurisdiction in the case before it.
The net result of Burger King and Asahi is that even if a plaintiff
satisfies the connecting factors and the reasonable expectation
requirements, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction under what is
essentially a balancing of interests, including the court’s own interest in
the exercise of jurisdiction.52
3. Fundamental Principles Extended and Withdrawn: Shaffer and

45. Id. at 477.
46. Id. at 482-83.
47. Id. at 482-86.
48. Id.
49. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
50. Id. at 113-16 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 116 (Brennan, J. concurring).
51. Id.
52. The Burger King/Asahi jurisdictional exit is remarkably similar to the subject matter
jurisdiction exit used by the Court in the context of arising under jurisdiction. See Gunn v. Minton,
133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). I examine this phenomenon in detail in A Modified Theory of the Law of
Federal Courts: The Case of Arising-Under Jurisdiction, supra note 2.
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Burnham
In 1977, the Court revisited the theme of personal jurisdiction and,
specifically, quasi in rem jurisdiction, in Shaffer v. Heitner.53 There,
Heitner filed a shareholder’s derivative suit in Delaware against the
Greyhound Corporation, its officers, members of its board of directors,
and one of its subsidiaries.54 Heitner seized approximately 82,000
shares of Greyhound stock owned by twenty-one of the defendants in an
attempt to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction over them in the Delaware
court. However, the Supreme Court held that exercising jurisdiction
would be inconsistent with due process because the property that was
attached—i.e., the shares—was not related to the plaintiff’s claims, and
thus the minimum contacts test had not been satisfied.55 Because these
defendants had no apparent contacts with Delaware other than the shares
that were attached, their contacts were insufficient to exercise personal
jurisdiction consistent with due process.56 Since the defendants could
not reasonably expect to be haled into court in Delaware on claims
unrelated to their contacts there, said the Court, the Delaware court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over them was inconsistent with the connectingfactors and reasonable-expectations principles of due process.57
Thus, in Shaffer, the Court took the fundamental principles of
International Shoe and extended them to a traditional basis of
jurisdiction, i.e., the presence of the property within the forum state. In
contrast to the Court’s intervention in Hanson, which was not doctrinally
necessary, the Court’s taking of this case was appropriate to endorse a
new approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction and to make that form of
jurisdiction consistent with due process. The Court, however, failed to
be adhere to this fundamental-rights approach and the rationale behind it
when, a few years later, it decided Burnham v. Superior Court58 and
concluded that not all the traditional bases of personal jurisdiction need
be consistent with the idea of connecting factors and reasonable
expectations, i.e., with due process.
In Burnham, the nine Justices concluded that a California state
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
who was in the state for only three days attending to matters unrelated to
the pending action, because he was personally served with process while
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Id. at 189.
Id., at 213.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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voluntarily present within the state.59 The Court’s majority (the plurality
and Justice White) believed that the exercise of this so-called tag
jurisdiction did not violate the “‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice’”60 because, as the plurality puts it, “its validation is
its pedigree.”61 Thus, the Court’s majority failed to conform this
traditional method of jurisdiction to the fundamental principles of due
process and instead relied on “pedigree” as a substitute for those
principles. In this sense, tag jurisdiction—at least until the Court revisits
it—remains a fundamental-principles anomaly.62
4. Fundamental Principles Suppressed: The Effects Test
In Kulko v. Superior Court,63 the Court considered whether a
California court could exercise personal jurisdiction “over a nonresident,
nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within the State.”64
The California Supreme Court had upheld the exercise of jurisdiction
under the “effects test,” the father having sent his daughter into
California to live permanently with her mother.65 In so ruling, the state
high court explained why it thought that the father had purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and protections of California law:
59. Id. Interestingly, however, Justice Brennan, commenting on Justice Scalia’s reliance on
historical precedents to justify transient jurisdiction in his concurring opinion, observed:
[R]eliance solely on historical pedigree . . . is foreclosed by our decisions in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington and Shaffer v. Heitner . . . . The critical insight of
Shaffer is that all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary
notions of due process. . . .
While our holding in Shaffer may have been limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction, our
mode of analysis was not.
Id. at 629-30 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). However, Justice Brennan’s minimum
contacts analysis, as applied to transient jurisdiction, was so broad as to be meaningless for the
purpose of subjecting the transient jurisdiction analysis to the minimum contacts test. In fact, his
test was such that persons transitorily present in the forum state would almost always have the
necessary minimum contacts to make the exercise of transient jurisdiction valid. See Robert TaylorManning, An Easy Case Makes Bad Law—Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct.
2105 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REV. 623, 631-32 (1991).
60. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
61. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621.
62. See FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 5, at 171-72 (questioning whether the
efficiencies of Burnham’s bright-line rule “outweigh the costs of the injustices it may allow”);
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and Forum
Conveniens 65 YALE L.J. 289, 303-04 (1956) (criticizing transient jurisdiction as a relic of
Pennoyer v. Neff).
63. Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
64. Id. at 86.
65. Id. at 89.
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[P]robably no parental act more fully invokes the benefits and
protections of California law than that by which a parent permits his
minor child to live in California. The parent thereby avails himself of
the total panoply of the state’s laws, institutions and resources—its
police and fire protection, its school system, its hospital services, its
recreational facilities, its libraries and museums, to mention only a
few.66

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Hanson’s purposeful
availment “requirement” had not been satisfied here.67 The Court
disagreed with the California Supreme Court’s purposeful availment
analysis in a single sentence placed in a footnote: “[I]n the
circumstances presented here, these services provided by the State were
essentially benefits to the child, not the father, and in any event were not
benefits that appellant purposefully sought for himself.”68
The Kulko Court approached purposeful availment as a technical,
non-contextual requirement. Instead of engaging in a realistic appraisal
of the facts, as the California Supreme Court had done, the U.S.
Supreme Court simply concluded, without elaboration, that it was the
child that was benefitting from California laws and protections, not the
father. Thus, the Kulko Court overlooked the meaningful contacts that
the father had with California. In this way, Kulko is quite similar to
Hanson in that the Court in both cases used a technical doctrine to avoid
a realistic appraisal of the facts.69
The Kulko Court further confused the law of jurisdiction by
observing, “In light of our conclusion that appellant did not purposefully
derive benefit from any activities relating to the State of California, it is
apparent that the California Supreme Court’s reliance on appellant’s
having caused an ‘effect’ in California was misplaced.”70 Here, the
Court was referring to § 37 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, the so-called “effects test.”71 Of course, that test contains no
66. Kulko v. Super. Ct., 564 P.2d 353, 356 (1977), rev’d, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
67. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94.
68. Id. at 94 n.7.
69. It is possible that the Court tortured the standard of personal jurisdiction in order to
advance a policy of fairness in the context of child-support proceedings. But even that instinct was
misplaced, since the father in Kulko had in fact waived any objection to personal jurisdiction in the
child-custody proceeding (as opposed to the child-custody aspect of the proceeding). Kulko, 436
U.S. at 88. Thus, any unfairness to the father in being required to defend the support proceeding
would seem to have been misplaced.
70. Id. at 96.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971). Section 37 provides:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects
in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from
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purposeful availment requirement. In fact, the test was specifically
designed to embrace circumstances where purposeful availment could
not logically be satisfied and yet where the exercise of jurisdiction
would be consistent with due process.72 By suggesting that purposeful
availment was nonetheless a prerequisite to the effects test, the Kulko
Court strayed further from the fundamentals of due process by allowing
a court to deny the exercise of jurisdiction when due process would in
fact be satisfied.
After Kulko, the case-by-case approach continued to erode the
coherence and strength of the minimum contacts formula. In Calder v.
Jones,73 the Court applied the effects test in the context of an intentional
tort. There, the Court held that California courts could exercise
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant journalists who had written and
edited a libelous story concerning the California activities of Jones, a
California resident, knowing that Jones would feel the brunt of the harm
there.74 The Court explained:
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a
California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer
whose television career was centered in California. The article was
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms
both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her
professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California
is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.
Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on
the “effects” of their Florida conduct in California. . . .
[Petitioners’] intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly
aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder
edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating
impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury
would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works
and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under
the circumstances, petitioners must “reasonably anticipate being
hauled into court there” to answer for the truth of the statements made
in their article.75

these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual’s relationship to the
state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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If we were to take the above passage as merely descriptive of the
Court’s reasoning, it might be seen as an unremarkable application of the
law of minimum contacts to the facts of the particular case. But if this
passage is meant to signify the endorsement of a particular doctrinal
model, it is troubling for two reasons.
First, it is completely unnecessary in light of the more general
principles established in International Shoe. Clearly, both the writer and
the editor who were sued in Calder had significant claim-related
connections with California (as the above passage makes clear). These
connecting factors should have led to an expectation of being subject to
jurisdiction in a California court on a claim so closely tied to those
connections. In other words, no special test was needed to establish
jurisdiction under these facts.
Second, the doctrinal formula described by the Court is
significantly narrower than the Restatement’s version of the effects test.
Under the Court’s doctrinal formula, jurisdiction may be established
under the effects test if: (1) the nonresident defendant had committed an
intentional tort, (2) that was aimed at the forum State, and (3) with the
knowledge that the plaintiff would feel the “brunt” of the harm in the
forum State.76 The effects test under the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, however, can be satisfied “when the defendant did not
intend to cause the particular effect in the state but could reasonably
have foreseen that it would result from his act done outside the state.”77
This formula includes no requirement of “aim” or “brunt;” nor is this
formula limited to intentional torts. In this way, the Restatement version
of the effects test more fully embraces the fundamental principles of due
process since it calls for examinations of all meaningful contacts. The
Calder formula, by contrast, is completely mechanical and, as such,
inflexible and incapable of taking into account and measuring
connections and expectations beyond the narrow contours of the
doctrinal formula.
One possible response is to say that the Calder formula merely
described a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction, not a necessary
one. That would be a welcome reading, but it is unfortunately not the
reading that a majority of lower federal courts have adopted.78 Even if
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
78. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1206 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1163 (2006); Fielding v. Hubert Bunda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d
419, 429 (5th Cir. 2005); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998). See
also IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 137-38; infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
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this sufficient-but-not-necessary reading of Calder were to be adopted,
we would still be left with the “why-bother” question, i.e., why add to
the doctrinal jargon if the basic standards would have been sufficient to
resolve the questions presented? In short, Calder presents a classic
example of the technicalities of doctrine supplanting the fundamental
principles on which the doctrine is based.
5. Fundamental Principles Submerged: The Stream of Commerce
Test
The “stream of commerce” doctrine provides yet another example
of mechanistic doctrine deflecting the jurisdictional inquiry from the
fundamental principles that ought to govern. Moreover, this example of
the phenomenon is particularly troubling since “stream of commerce” is
a completely redundant doctrine in that the effects test (as contemplated
in the Restatement) is itself fully capable of embracing all the situations
to which stream of commerce potentially applies. In fact, there is not a
single stream of commerce decision that could not be fully and
adequately resolved under the Restatement’s effects test. In this sense,
stream of commerce is a double-filtered deflection from the fundamental
inquiry into due process.
The stream of commerce refers to the chain of distribution of a
product that goes from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer. A
manufacturer producing a product in a state or foreign nation, and
intentionally selling it through a chain of distribution that may employ
exporters, importers, distributors and retailers, is considered to have
purposefully affiliated itself with the state where the ultimate consumer
is located and the injury occurs.
This test traces its roots to Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., a sensible 1961 decision by the Illinois Supreme Court
that was premised largely on the fundamentals of due process and in
which the phrase “stream of commerce” never appears.79 In Gray, the
plaintiff was injured when a water heater she purchased in Illinois
exploded there, allegedly due to a defective safety valve. The valve was
manufactured in Ohio and then shipped to Pennsylvania where it was
placed on the water heater. The water heater was then shipped into
Illinois for retail purchase. Plaintiff sued both the manufacturer of the
water heater, a Pennsylvania company, and the manufacturer of the
valve, an Ohio company, in an Illinois court. The valve manufacturer

79.
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moved to quash service, arguing that it was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Illinois, as it did not do business there and had no
registered agent for service there.80 The trial court quashed service, but
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed.81 After holding that the Illinois
long-arm statute was sufficiently broad to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction over the valve manufacturer, the court turned to the question
of whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with due
process.82
Interestingly enough, the Illinois Supreme Court did not use the
phrase “stream of commerce” nor did it purport to be creating a new
jurisdictional doctrine. Rather, the court simply relied on fundamental
principles derived from International Shoe and McGee, among other
cases, to explain why the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign
manufacturer comported with due process:
In the case at bar defendant does not claim that the present use of its
product in Illinois is an isolated instance. While the record does not
disclose the volume of Titan’s business or the territory in which
appliances incorporating its valves are marketed, it is a reasonable
inference that its commercial transactions, like those of other
manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this State.
To the extent that its business may be directly affected by transactions
occurring here it enjoys benefits from the laws of this State, and it has
undoubtedly benefited, to a degree, from the protection which our law
has given to the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves.83

Eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court’s careful consideration of due
process principles acquired the “stream of commerce” label. That label
then evolved into a doctrine and, nearly twenty years after the decision
in Gray, the U.S. Supreme Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,84 endorsed the doctrine by way of dicta:
The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State. Cf. Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 762.
Id. at 762 & 767.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 766.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. V. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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N.E.2d 761 (1961).85

Given the fundamentals of the due process standard as embodied in the
minimum contacts test, this endorsement would seem to have been
completely superfluous. After all, the Illinois state court had properly
understood International Shoe and applied it in a “stream of commerce”
context, reaching the same result the official “stream of commerce”
doctrine would have achieved.
Of course, the specific act or conduct sufficient to meet the due
process requirement must be identified and described by a court
applying the minimum contacts test, but this description need not, in
itself, create new doctrine. If each such description creates a new
jurisdictional doctrine or an offshoot of settled doctrine, the law of due
process becomes nothing more than a complex web of fact-specific
outcomes, further and further removed from the core principles of the
due process standard. Under such an evolving-standards model, each
fact-specific decision by the Supreme Court will inevitably offer new
possibilities for gaps in the existing web, generating yet another neatly
labeled jurisdictional doctrine.
A few years after World-Wide Volkswagen incanted the magic
phrase “stream of commerce,” the Court granted certiorari in Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court86 to resolve a conflict that had
arisen in lower courts over the scope of what had become the stream-ofcommerce test. Some of those courts required that a manufacturer,
whose goods reached the forum state through the stream of commerce,
to have also taken some affirmative action to promote the sales of its
products within that state, i.e., a so-called “plus factor.”87 Other courts
did not require the plus factor.88 The Supreme Court was unable to
resolve the conflict and instead split four-to-four, with one Justice
declining to address the question.89
While the Asahi Court did not provide any direction to the lower
courts as to the scope of the stream-of-commerce test, it did do one thing
with respect to cases arising in this context. It made it clear that the
unresolved question—plus or no plus?—was quintessentially technical
and doctrinal, and not premised on the fundamental due process
questions pertaining to connecting factors, expectations or, more
85. Id. at 298-99.
86. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
87. Id. at 111-12 (citing cases).
88. Id. at 111 (citing cases).
89. See id. at 116 (Brennan, J. concurring in the judgment); id. at 121 (Stevens, J.
concurring).
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generally, fairness and reasonableness.
Basically, Asahi pressed
International Shoe further into the background.
The Court’s most recent foray into the stream of commerce test
came in 2011 with the decision in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v.
Nicastro.90 In McIntyre, the plurality admitted that “[t]his Court’s Asahi
decision may be responsible in part for [the state] court’s error regarding
the stream of commerce, and this case presents an opportunity to provide
greater clarity.”91 In short, it was time to eliminate the confusion.92
However, despite the Court’s good intentions, no greater clarity was
provided and, worse, as Justice Ginsburg convincingly explained in her
dissent, International Shoe and the minimum contacts test would have
easily resolved the case and demanded a different outcome.93
In many ways, the decision in McIntyre provides a perfect exemplar
of the potential deficiencies of the modern case-by-case doctrinal
approach to due process. In McIntyre, the plaintiff, Nicastro severely
injured his hand while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (McIntyre UK). Nicastro filed a productsliability action against McIntyre UK and others in a New Jersey state
court. The accident occurred in New Jersey, but the machine was
manufactured in England, where McIntyre UK was incorporated and
operated. McIntyre UK did not directly market its products in New
Jersey nor did it ship any of them there. However, McIntyre UK had a
relationship with an independent distributor, McIntyre Machinery
America, Ltd. (McIntyre America), that promoted and sold McIntyre’s
machines in the United States market. In addition, McIntyre UK’s
representatives attended trade shows in Chicago, Las Vegas, New
Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San Francisco, all to promote sales of
its products throughout the United States. At one of those conventions
in Las Vegas, where McIntyre UK was an exhibitor, Nicastro’s
employer learned of McIntyre UK’s machine, and decided to buy one.
McIntyre America then shipped the machine to New Jersey where it
eventually injured Nicastro. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction in New Jersey over McIntyre UK.94
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. There was no

90. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
91. Id. at 2786.
92. As Professor Arthur Miller has observed, “Trying to determine what the diverging
opinions [in McIntyre] mean to counsel in the coming years presents a bit of a mystery.” 4 FED.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.4 (3d. ed. 2013).
93. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2786 (plurality).
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majority opinion for the Court.95 The four-person plurality opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy correctly observed that the stream of
commerce test—which it called a “metaphor”—was not a substitute for
due process analysis, but then went on to define stream of commerce in a
manner that created a shield to any consideration of the due process
fundamentals.96 The plurality’s definition of stream of commerce was
concise, but virtually empty of content. In the words of the McIntyre
plurality, “[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise
of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the
forum.”97 The “target” metaphor is left unexplained, though it seems
akin to the “aim” element of the effects test. It would seem then that the
plurality endorsed a narrow, doctrinal “metaphor” that, while not a
“substitute” for due process analysis, operates to prevent a court from
ever getting to a true due process analysis by creating a gate-keeping
standard that prevents consideration of the fundamental fairness
principles established in International Shoe. Similarly, Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion adopted his own “single-sale” limitation on use of
the stream-of-commerce approach, thereby obviating any need to look
into the fundamental due process concerns triggered by the facts in such
cases.98
As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent:
McIntyre UK’s regular attendance and exhibitions . . . was surely a
purposeful step to reach customers for its products “anywhere in the
United States.” At least as purposeful was McIntyre UK’s engagement
of McIntyre America as the conduit for sales of McIntyre UK’s
machines to buyers “throughout the United States.” Given McIntyre
UK’s endeavors to reach and profit from the United States market as a
whole, Nicastro’s suit, I would hold, has been brought in a forum
entirely appropriate for the adjudication of his claim. He alleges that
McIntyre UK’s shear machine was defectively designed or
manufactured and, as a result, caused injury to him at his workplace.
The machine arrived in Nicastro’s New Jersey workplace not randomly
or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and distribution
system that McIntyre UK deliberately arranged.99

Justice Ginsburg was right. International Shoe would have recognized
these connecting factors as creating a reasonable expectation of a lawsuit
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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Id. at 2785 (plurality).
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 88 (2011).
Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
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in those forums where the marketing strategy succeeded and where a
product-based injury occurred.100 Although her instinct was correct,
Justice Ginsburg also took a misstep. Rather than focusing on the
fundamental principles established in International Shoe, she then tried
to fit the case into her own reformulation of the stream-of-commerce
test, one with a “national contacts” overlay. Specifically, she noted:
In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and
sell its machines in the United States, “purposefully availed itself” of
the United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a
discrete collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the
market of all States in which its products were sold by its exclusive
distributor.101

One of the ironies of McIntyre is that the New Jersey state courts seemed
to have understood the fundamental principles at stake, and displayed a
stronger intuitive sense of their scope and operation of those
principles102 than did the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Justices of
the Supreme Court appeared to be trapped in and confused by their own
personalized tests and by the interpretations of their own interpretations.
As a consequence, what was in fact a relatively simple case of a
nonresident defendant whose commercial activities manifested its intent
to affiliate itself through commercial activity in the forum state set the

100. Justice Ginsburg observed:
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United States for machines it
manufactures. It hopes to derive substantial revenue from sales it makes to United States
purchasers. Where in the United States buyers reside does not matter to this
manufacturer. Its goal is simply to sell as much as it can, wherever it can. It excludes no
region or State from the market it wishes to reach. But, all things considered, it prefers
to avoid products liability litigation in the United States. To that end, it engages a U.S.
distributor to ship its machines stateside. Has it succeeded in escaping personal
jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is sold and causes injury or even death to
a local user? Under this Court’s pathmarking precedent in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), and subsequent decisions, one would expect the
answer to be unequivocally, “No.” But instead, six Justices of this Court, in divergent
opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has avoided the jurisdiction of our state courts,
except perhaps in States where its products are sold in sizeable quantities. Inconceivable
as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today “turn[s] the clock back to
the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into
court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having
independent distributors market it.” (citing Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the
Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995)).
Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
101. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
102. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010).
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stage for yet further confusion and new doctrinal twists.103 In short, the
New Jersey Supreme Court recognized what was obvious and
fundamental, and thus got it right, but the U.S. Supreme Court, engaged
in doctrinal contretemps, did not.
As noted above, stream of commerce is, in essence, a specialized
version of the effects test. By manufacturing a product outside of the
state and then placing it into the “stream of commerce” with the
expectation and, indeed, the hope that it will reach the forum state, the
manufacturer has caused a totally foreseeable effect in the forum state
through activities undertaken elsewhere if the product in fact reaches
that state and injures a consumer there. Not surprisingly, the
Restatement therefore considers “stream of commerce” to be an
expression of the effects test:
The causing of effects in a state by means of an act done outside the
state is today a jurisdictional basis of immense importance. Many of
the current court decisions involve this basis. It plays a particularly
significant role in the area of product liability. A common situation is
where a product is taken from one state to another and there causes
injury or is the subject of some other claim as, for example, one for
breach of warranty. The question then arises whether the state to
which the product has been taken has judicial jurisdiction over, as the
case may be, the out-of-state manufacturer, assembler, importer,
distributor or ultimate seller. Frequently, the answer will be in the
affirmative.104

Thus, for the same reasons that the effects test (as contemplated by the
Restatement) is a product of the fundamentals of due process—
connecting factors and reasonable expectations—so, too, is the stream of
commerce test. However, to the extent that either the effects test or the
stream of commerce test operates as a mechanistic gatekeeper to the
fundamental questions of due process, the test undermines the principles
it should in fact serve.
From this review of the Supreme Court’s post-International Shoe
cases, it should now be clear that the increasing lack of any uniform
rules, and the development of redundant, misguided, increasingly factspecific tests, have confused the Supreme Court as to the real scope of
the minimum contacts test. As a consequence, the results have been
often contradictory and inconsistent, and increasingly distant from the
fundamental principles of due process.
103.
104.
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B. Doctrinal Confusion in State and Lower Federal Courts
1. The Post-Hanson Meaning of “Purposeful Availment”
The “purposeful availment” requirement established in Hanson has
led not only to confusion, but also to the rejection of jurisdiction in cases
where its exercise would comport with the due process principles
endorsed in International Shoe. The decision of the California Supreme
Court in Sibley v. Superior Court105 provides an illustrative example. In
that case, the question was whether an out-of-state guarantor on a
contractual performance to be undertaken in California could be
subjected to jurisdiction in a California court based simply on having
caused an effect in the state.106 The California Supreme Court held that
despite the obvious effect caused by the guarantor—the guaranty led to a
contract that was to be performed in California—jurisdiction could not
be exercised over the nonresident guarantor.107 This is consistent with
Hanson, since the guarantor had not sought any California benefit from
the transaction or, stated differently, he had not “purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting business in California or of the
benefits and protections of California laws.”108 In essence, Sibley
applied “purposeful availment” literally,109 thus creating a doctrinal
limitation on jurisdiction wholly inconsistent with due process principles
of connecting factors and reasonable expectations.
The decision in Sibley should not be seen as aberrational or a
maverick. As recently as 2012, the Supreme Court of Kansas declared
that “the ‘effects’ test in Calder does not, however, replace the need to
demonstrate minimum contacts that constitute purposeful availment—
that is conduct by the non-resident defendant that invoked the benefits
and protections of the state or was otherwise purposefully directed
toward a state resident.”110 Under this approach, the effects test is
rendered superfluous since whether it is satisfied, the jurisdictional
decision must ultimately rest on the principle of “purposeful availment.”
While the Kansas court, to its credit, rejected a mechanical reliance on
the “effects test,” it then fell back on another mechanical test, namely,
“purposeful availment.”111
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Sibley v. Super. Ct., 546 P.2d 322 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976).
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 325.
Sibley was overruled by Kulko v. Superior Court, 564 P.2d 353(1977).
See Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo, 275 P.3d 869, 885 (Kan. 2012).
Id. at 889.
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Hanson and its absolute “purposeful availment” requirement, has
even infected the realm of statutory interpretation—to the extent that
courts seek to interpret jurisdictional statutes so as to preserve their
constitutionality. Thus, in Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz,112 the New York
Court of Appeals, interpreting the state’s long-arm statute, imposed a
type of purposeful availment requirement on the exercise of jurisdiction
that excluded use of the effects test in situations where its application
would have been totally consistent with due process. Hence, the
doctrinal error of Hanson was imported into the statutory law of New
York.
At the same time, other courts were construing “purposeful
availment” to embrace jurisdiction premised on a nonresident
defendant’s causing an effect in the forum state.113 Eventually, some
courts came to recognize that the purposeful availment standard was, at
best, incomplete since it did not encompass anything like the full range
of jurisdiction permitted under the due process clause. As the Ninth
Circuit explained in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitisme,114 the phrase “purposeful availment” is inappropriate in
situations where a nonresident has committed an intentional tort outside
the state with foreseeable effects in the state. In that context, even
though the defendant cannot be said to have availed himself of the
forum’s benefits, the exercise of jurisdiction would nevertheless be
consistent with due process. It is enough, according to the Ninth Circuit,
that the defendant’s relationship with the state was a product of
“purposeful direction.”115 Thus, by asking the right question—what
factors connect the defendant’s activity to the forum state—the Ninth
Circuit wisely moved the doctrine back toward the fundamentals of due
process by its willingness to jettison a requirement of “purposeful
availment” in favor of a realistic appraisal of a connecting factor.116

112. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007).
113. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965) (in chambers opinion of
Justice Goldberg) (holding that the purposeful availment standard generally requires “requirement
that the defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have an effect in the forum state.”
(quoting David P. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533, 549 (1963)));
Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1978) (purposeful availment satisfied if defendant’s
out of state actions have “foreseeable effects” in the forum). Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (caused consequences in the forum).
114. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2006).
115. Id. at 1206.
116. Id. at 1205-08.
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2. The Effects Test
As I have noted, the measure of jurisdiction for activities taking
place outside a state that cause an effect within the state should require
no more than a straightforward application of the due process standards
described by the Court in International Shoe. If that activity causes a
foreseeable effect in the state, the party who engaged in that activity will
likely have a reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum on a
claim arising out of that effect. The Restatement version of the effects
test was written to capture the wide range of possibilities that might arise
in this context.117 The doctrinal version of the effects test that has
emerged from the decision in Calder v. Jones,118 however, appears to be
more circumscribed and less likely to embrace the full range of due
process possibilities. As a consequence, plaintiffs are often denied
access to a forum to which they are entitled.
Lower federal court opinions applying the effects test can be
correctly described as including a “mixture of broad and narrow
As one court phrased it, in an obvious
interpretations.”119
understatement, federal courts “have struggled somewhat with Calder’s
import.”120 The range of interpretations does, however, appear to share a
common premise: the elements that the Calder Court identified as being
sufficient to satisfy due process—i.e., an intentional tort, aimed at the
forum, with the brunt of the harm felt there—have been transformed
from the sufficient into the necessary. Hence, a set of circumstances
under which due process was deemed to have been satisfied is now
treated as defining the limits of due process. In this way, the doctrine
has come to trump the constitutional due process standard.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Third Circuit has limited the
effects test to the following circumstances:
The defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) The plaintiff felt the
brunt of the harm in the forum such that the forum can be said to be the
focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that tort;
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious

117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 37 (1971), Reporter’s Note
(explaining that the many cases described involve different factual situations).
118. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
119. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998).
120. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). See
generally IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 137-38.
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activity. . . .121

As to the first element, the First Circuit has taken even a narrower view
and suggested that the effects test should be limited to defamation cases
only.122 As to the third element, “aim,” the Fifth Circuit requires that (1)
the subject matter of and (2) the sources relied upon for the article to
have been from the forum state.123 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
has somewhat softened the edges of the second element, the “brunt”
requirement, by demanding only a “foreseeable harm” in the forum.124
At the same time, however, it has refused to apply the effects test to a
contracts claim,125 which is somewhat peculiar since the effects test was
specifically designed to reflect personal jurisdiction decisions involving
contracts.126 The one circuit court decision that appeared to adopt a
more open-ended approach to the effects test has been limited by a
subsequent decision of that same circuit.127
Ironically, in some cases where the elements of the three-part
effects test would be satisfied, a federal court will nonetheless conclude
that the assertion of jurisdiction would violate due process, without
reference to the effects test. For example, in Fox v. Boucher,128 a
landlord in New York brought diversity action for a prima facie tort
against the father of a tenant. The defendant was a resident of
Massachusetts. The plaintiff landlord alleged that the defendant made a
single telephone call from Massachusetts to the plaintiff in New York,
and that the comments of the defendant during that phone call caused the
plaintiff extreme mental and physical suffering.129 Finding that the
defendant’s contacts with New York were not sufficient to satisfy due
process, a New York court held that:
One single telephone call made to New York State is insufficient
contact to support a suit initiated in that forum against an out-of-state
resident under either the contract or tort provisions [of New York’s
long-arm statute] of CPLR 302. The mere possibility of foreseeable
121. See IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 265–66.
122. See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir. 2001).
123. Fielding v. Hubert Bunda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2005).
124. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 848-53 (9th Cir. 2011).
125. McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817 (9th Cir. 1988).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 37 (1971), cmt. a.
127. See Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1997) (“effects” jurisdiction
sustained in the absence of aim); but see Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 705-06 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 567 (2010) (interpreting Janmark as requiring “something more” directed at
the forum).
128. Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 36-37.
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consequences in New York does not give New York in personam
jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court states there must be “some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.” It would offend “minimum contacts” due
process principles to force [the defendant], a Massachusetts resident, to
litigate in a New York forum on the basis of one telephone call.130

Here, although the tort consisted in a single contact, i.e., a single phone
call to the state, the three-part effects test seems to have been satisfied:
(1) the defendant committed an intentional tort (i.e., an act constituting
intentional infliction of emotional distress), (2) the phone call was aimed
at the plaintiff in the forum state (in fact, the defendant dialed the New
York area code when making the phone call), and (3) the defendant
knew that the plaintiff lived in New York and, thus, that he would have
felt the brunt of the harm there. The doctrinal “tripping” point for the
Fox court seems to have been the abstraction of purposeful availment, an
appendage to the principles of due process imposed by the Court in
Hanson.131 However, the Court in International Shoe made it clear that
even a single contact could be a sufficient basis on which to assert
jurisdiction,132 and reaffirmed that principle in McGee.133 Perhaps the
exercise of jurisdiction in Fox would have been unreasonable under the
circumstances, but that question differs markedly from issues pertaining
to the sufficiency of the connecting factors.134
State courts, often relying on federal precedents, have adopted
similarly narrow versions of the effects test. Pavlovich v. Superior
Court,135 a decision by the California Supreme Court, provides a good
example. In that case, the licensor of encryption technology used to
prevent the copying of DVDs containing motion pictures sued a resident
of Texas for misappropriation of trade secrets for having posted on the
internet the source code that would allow the decryption and copying of
those DVDs. The suit was filed in a California state court. The
130. Id. at 37 (citations omitted).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
132. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
134. To be precise, it is not proper to talk about “purposeful availment” in a tort situation. As
the Ninth Circuit has correctly indicated, in torts contexts it is more appropriate to say that, by
committing the tort, the nonresident defendant “purposefully directs” his activity towards the forum
State, rather than saying that he “purposefully avails” himself of the benefit and protection of the
laws of the state. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1205-06 (9th Cir. 2006).
135. Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
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assertion of jurisdiction was premised on the theory that the defendant
should have known that his actions would have an adverse impact on the
motion picture industry located in that state.136 In ruling that jurisdiction
could not be asserted consistently with due process, the California
Supreme Court relied largely on federal precedents interpreting the
scope of the effects test, and in so doing, endorsed the Third Circuit’s
three-part formula.137 The specific issue before the California Supreme
Court was whether the “aim” prong of the test could be satisfied by the
mere knowledge that the posting would have an adverse effect in
California.138 The court concluded that mere knowledge was insufficient
to satisfy that prong.139 Thus, the California Supreme Court participated
in the refinement of a doctrine—knowledge does not satisfy aim—that is
ever more precise and yet ever more removed from the fundamental due
process inquiry.140
As one might infer from the Pavlovich decision, the case-by-case
method can be expected to give rise to yet further doctrinal
complications in cases involving the internet. While beyond the scope
of this discussion, it is fair to note that jurisdictional law relating to the
internet, like the effects test itself, tends to deflect the jurisdictional
consideration away from the fundamentals of due process and into the
technicalities of the “Zippo” doctrine141 and other like “refinements” on
the law of jurisdiction.
3. The Stream of Commerce Test
The stream of commerce test has provided a considerable source of
confusion in lower federal courts. As one commentator observed,
Personal jurisdiction analysis now varies depending on which circuit a
litigant files in. If a plaintiff is savvy enough to pick a circuit
embracing Brennan’s foreseeability view, minimum contacts will
likely be found. This is particularly true where that same jurisdiction,
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 8.
138. Id. at 9-10.
139. Id. at 11.
140. State courts have taken an array of approaches to the effects test. See, e.g., Aeroflex
Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo, 275 P.3d 869 (Kan. 2012) (effects test requires a separate showing of
purposeful availment); Davis v. Simon, 963 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that some
federal courts treat the three-part test as mandatory, but declining to take a position on that
question); Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (three-part test, but
“knowledge that the effects would be felt” in the forum substituted for “brunt”); Pitts v. Fink, 698
S.E.2d 626, 632 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (strict three-part test).
141. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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after finding “purposeful conduct” then transfers the burden to the
defendant to demonstrate “unfairness.” Conversely, if a plaintiff files
in the First, Fourth, Sixth, or Eleventh Circuits, a finding of personal
jurisdiction may be less likely, given the same facts, because those
circuits employ the O’Connor test requiring a much more specialized
showing to reach “purposeful conduct.”142

Prior to the 2011 decision in McIntyre, the First,143 Fourth,144 and
Sixth,145 Circuits had adopted the O’Connor stream of commerce plus
test, while the Fifth,146 Seventh,147 and Eighth148 Circuits opted for
Brennan’s pure stream of commerce formula.149 Other federal circuit
courts declined to decide the issue and instead used both tests, as well as
Justice Stevens’ alternate approach.150 Panels in the Eleventh Circuit
have both adopted and declined to adopt the plus test.151 At least one
circuit has noted the substantial confusion over the content of the
doctrine.152 Federal district courts are in an equal state of disarray153 and
142. Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and
the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U.L. REV. 681,
682-83 (2009). Note that the Eleventh Circuit has taken contrary positions on this issue. Compare
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (O’Connor plus) with Vermeulen v. Renault,
U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993) (opting not to make
a choice).
143. Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (same).
144. Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945–46 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1151 (1995) (same).
145. Fortis Corporate Ins. v. Viken Ship Mgmt., 450 F.3d 214, 220 (6th Cir. 2006).
146. Luv N’ Care v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904
(2006).
147. Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992).
148. Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929
(2001).
149. See, e.g., Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613–15
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 948 (1994) (following Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce test);
Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Dehmlow v.
Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
150. See, e.g., Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 1999); Pennzoil
Products Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 1998); Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45
F.3d 1541, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1122 (1995) (following International Shoe
purposeful availment test for patent infringement cases); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985
F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993).
151. Compare Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1993) (O’Connor plus) with
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907
(1993) (opting not to make a choice).
152. See Commissariat A L’Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 395 F.3d
1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
153. See, e.g., Askue v. Aurora Corp. of Am., No. 1:10-cv-0984-JEC, 2012 WL 843939, at
*5-6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2012); Newman v. European Aero. Def. & Space Co., No. 09-10138-DJC,
2011 WL 2413792, at *5 (D. Mass. June 16, 2011); Belden Tech., Inc. v. LS Corp., 829 F. Supp. 2d
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as I have noted, the decision in McIntyre did nothing to allay that
confusion.
Not surprisingly, state courts have also struggled with the stream of
commerce concept. Some have adopted the stream of commerce plus
test,154 sometimes leading to results that fly in the face of fundamental
due process principles.155 Others have adopted the Brennan model.156
Still others have declined to resolve the question altogether.157 In
addition, various state courts have come up with their own unique
formulations of the doctrine. Here are a few examples of those
variations with rising and falling levels of specificity and generality:
It is sufficient that, as here, the defendant purposefully sets his product
or his designs into the stream of commerce, knowing or having reason
to know that they will reach the forum state and that they create a
potential risk of injury.158 (Alaska Supreme Court)
This court has decided that purposeful minimum contacts are
established when an out-of-state manufacturer places its products in
the stream of interstate commerce, because under those circumstances
it is fair to charge the manufacturer with knowledge that its conduct
might have consequences in another state.159 (Washington Supreme
Court)
[I]njuries were caused by products introduced into the stream of
commerce by defendants whose primary interest was to benefit
economically from their use in other states. Correspondingly, the
260, 269 (D. Del. 2010); Step2 Co., LLC v. Parallax Group Intern., LLC, No. 5:08CV2580, 2010
WL 3783151, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2010).
154. See, e.g., Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2010); State v. N. Atl. Ref.
Ltd., 999 A.2d 396, 406 (N.H. 2010); CSR, Ltd. v. Taylor, 983 A.2d 492, 507 (Md. 2009).
155. See, e.g., CSR, Ltd., 983 A.2d at 508 (For example, a Maryland court of appeals applied
the O’Connor stream of commerce test and held that cargo “introduced into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that it w[ill] arrive in th[e] forum” was sufficient to constitute purposeful
availment to Maryland. Hence, after granting foreign distributor’s petition for writ of certiorari, the
court held that the foreign distributor’s act of shipping raw asbestos through port at which
stevedores worked, did not constitute the requisite purposeful availment for a Maryland court to be
able to exercise jurisdiction over the distributor).
156. See, e.g., Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 647 (Ala. 2009); Kopke v. A. Hartrodt
S.R.L., 629 N.W.2d 662, 674-65 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1079 (2002).
157. See, e.g., State ex rel. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 237 P.3d 199, 207 (Okla.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2150 (2011); Etchieson v. Cent. Purchasing, LLC, 232 P.3d 301, 307
(Colo. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Grand River Enter., Inc., 757 N.W.2d 305, 313-15 (S.D. 2008);
Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 731 So. 2d 881, 889 (La.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1019 (1999).
158. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Traweek, 561 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Alaska 1977) (emphasis
added).
159. Grange Ins. Ass’n v. State, 757 P.2d 933, 938 (Wash. 1988) (emphasis added).
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forum states had an overriding interest in the protection of their
citizens from injuries resulting from the use of these products.160
(Hawai’i Supreme Court)
In placing their goods in the flow of interstate commerce, the
respondents must have had the reasonable expectation that such items
would be shipped indiscriminately throughout the United States. If
dangerously defective goods are placed in the interstate flow of
commerce, those whose negligence created the defect should be
prepared to defend themselves wherever injury should occur.161
(Idaho Supreme Court)

The critical point here is that the stream of commerce test has no set
meaning in federal or state courts and it has no apparent utility that could
not be achieved more effectively by reference to the fundamental
standards of due process (or by application of the effects test).
Moreover, given its elasticity, it necessarily invites an arbitrary pattern
of results that violate fundamental principles of due process.
4. A Lesson from Tailored Long-Arm Statutes
Tailored long-arm statutes provide relatively detailed specifications
of the circumstances under which a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction. As a consequence, one might think that the relatively
precise guidance provided by such statutes would eliminate the neverending layering of doctrine upon doctrine caused by the case-by-case
minimum contacts approach. Yet this has not been so for three reasons.
First, if jurisdiction is to be exercised, the application of a tailored longarm statute is merely a prelude to the application of due process, not a
substitute. Thus, any application of a long-arm statute must still be
tested against the Due Process Clause. Second, as noted above, in an
effort to capture the fact-specific rulings of due process doctrine, states
find themselves in a never-ending process of amending and interpreting
their long-arm statutes. Thus, case-by-case due process doctrine
constantly invades the territory of the tailored long-arm statute and often
end up distorting their wording and original rationales. This is
especially true in those states that do not interpret their tailored long-arm
statutes as embracing the full extent of due process.162 Finally, the
highly specified nature of a tailored long-arm statute operates much like
160. Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568, 572 (Haw. 1975) (emphasis added).
161. Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., 454 P.2d 63, 68–69 (Idaho 1969) (emphasis added).
162. These states are Georgia, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin as well as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
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fact-specific doctrine in that it deflects courts from a direct consideration
of the fundamental due process principles at stake in the personal
jurisdiction analysis, and instead focuses a court’s attention on the
technicalities of the statutory specifications.
The struggle to conform Georgia’s tailored long-arm statute to
modern reality is instructive.163 Section 9-10-91(2) of the Georgia longarm statute provides Georgia courts the authority to exercise jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who “[c]ommits a tortious act or omission
within this State. . . .” Georgia courts initially interpreted this statutory
language as not covering tortious acts committed outside the state.164 In
response, the legislature added subsection (3) to § 9-10-91, expressly
vesting Georgia courts with the power to exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who caused an effect in the state by a tortious act
or omission committed outside the state “if the tortfeasor regularly does
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
163. The current Georgia long-arm statute provides:
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his or her
executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions,
ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if
he or she were a resident of this state, if in person or through an agent, he or she:
(1) Transacts any business within this state;
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act;
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state
if the tortfeasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered in this state;
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state; or
(5) With respect to proceedings for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, or other
domestic relations action or with respect to an independent action for support of
dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the
commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the
commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not,
notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state
and as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support, apportionment of debt, or
real or personal property orders or agreements, if one party to the marital relationship
continues to reside in this state. This paragraph shall not change the residency
requirement for filing an action for divorce.
(6) Has been subject to the exercise of jurisdiction of a court of this state which has
resulted in an order of alimony, child custody, child support, equitable apportionment of
debt, or equitable division of property, notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one
of the original parties from this state, if the action involves modification of such order
and the moving party resides in this state, or if the action involves enforcement of such
order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party.
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2012).
164. Castleberry v. Gold Agency, 185 S.E.2d 557 (1971); O’Neal Steel v. Smith, 169 S.E.2d
827 (1969).
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or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this state.”165 In a case interpreting both sections, and
despite the text of subsection (2), the Georgia Supreme Court, somewhat
oddly, held that both subsections (2) and (3) permitted the exercise of
jurisdiction over defendants who had committed tortious acts or
omissions outside the state.166 The state high court later revisited that
decision and returned to a “literal construction” of § 9-10-91, ruling that
only subsection (3) permitted the exercise of jurisdiction when the
tortious act occurred outside the state.167
While interpreting subsections (2) and (3) of § 9-10-91, Georgia
courts were also busy interpreting subdivision (1) of the same statute and
held that that provision, which was triggered when a nonresident
defendant transacted “any business within the state,” applied only in
contract cases or where the nonresident defendant was physically present
within the state. The Georgia courts reached this conclusion even
though the text of the statute did not literally impose either
requirement.168
This was the state of the law when the Georgia Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, LLC v.
First Nat. Bank of Ames,169 a case involving a combination of tort and
contract claims premised largely on activities arising outside of the state,
but having an adverse effect in the state. The state court of appeals had
held that jurisdiction could not be asserted over the tort claims under
subsections (1), (2), or (3) of the state’s long-arm statute.170 The
Georgia Supreme Court agreed that neither subsection (2) nor (3) was
satisfied under the facts presented, but concluded that subsection (1)—
the transacting business section—could be used in tort cases since it
vested Georgia courts with jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by
due process of law.171
The serpentine interpretation of the Georgia long-arm statute is
instructive.172 A tailored long-arm statute operates in much the same
165. GA CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(3) (West 2014).
166. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 399, 400-01 (1973).
167. Gust v. Flint, 356 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1987).
168. See Innovative Clinical & Consulting Serv., LLC v. First Nat. Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d
353, 355 (Ga. 2005) (discussing this state of affairs).
169. Id. at 353.
170. Id. at 355.
171. Id.
172. In fact, we have described only the tip of iceberg of the interpretive complexities
generated by Georgia’s long-arm statute. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor,
Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study
Reconceptualizing the Typical Long-Arm Statute to Codify and Refine International Shoe After Its
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fashion as judge-made doctrine. The focus of the jurisdictional inquiry
is deflected from the fundamentals of due process—connecting factors
and reasonable expectations—and centers instead on the details of the
text and on judicial interpretations and re-interpretations of that text.
Instead of attending to fundamental principles, courts and litigants fight
over the words, the gaps between words, and the inconsistencies that
form within any body of interpretation. Hence, while a tailored longarm statute may seem like a path to clarity, the opposite has often been
true.
We can observe these same patterns and interpretive stretches in
other states that have not construed their long-arm statutes as going to
the full extent of due process. For example, in West Virginia, a
commentary on the West Virginia’s long-arm statute expands the scope
of the term “business” to include noncommercial activities:
To assume that the legislature intended W.Va. Code § 56-3-33 to apply
only to commercial activities of unincorporated businesses would be to
apply an unduly limited meaning to that phrase. The term “business”
need not necessarily imply an activity tinged with commercial aspects;
it is enough if the activity undertaken by the non-resident defendant is
such that the non-resident can or should expect to derive a benefit
therefrom. The non-resident defendant’s activity must be purposeful
but it need not be intimately intertwined with the defendant’s
livelihood.173

It is, however, hard to describe “business,” as an activity from which the
nonresident defendant might gain only a moral or personal benefit.174
Still, such noncommercial activity would seem to be covered by the
West Virginia long-arm statute, as explained by the relevant
commentary.175 However, in a way, all of this is beside the point, for
whether a particular form of activity can be properly characterized as a
“business” has no bearing on whether that activity represents a dueprocess-sufficient connecting factor with the forum.
First Sixty Years, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT. REV. 339 (2007).
173. Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. W.V. 1981); see also 11B M.J.
Jurisdiction § 15 (2011).
174. However, see CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 30 (Serenity Publishers 2008)
(1843) (“Business!” cried the Ghost, wringing its hands again. “Mankind was my business. The
common welfare was my business; charity, mercy, forbearance, and benevolence, were, all, my
business. The dealings of my trade were but a drop of water in the comprehensive ocean of my
business!”)
175. The courts of New York have also construed the “transacting business” component of the
state’s long-arm statute as not being restricted to commercial activities. Best Van Lines, Inc. v.
Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 247 n.10 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Similar interpretative questions arose in Kopke v. A. Hartrodt
S.R.L.,176 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court confronted the text of its
long-arm statute in the context of a products liability suit. Kopke, a
truck driver, was injured when he opened a cargo container in Neenah,
Wisconsin. The injury occurred when a pallet loaded with paper fell out
of the container and landed on him. L’Arciere, an employee-owned
Italian cooperative, had loaded the pallet into the cargo container in
Italy. Kopke brought a personal injury claim against L’Arciere and
others in a Wisconsin state court. L’Arciere moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. The County Circuit Court denied this motion
and ruled that L’Arciere’s acts of stabilizing the products being shipped
by surrounding the product with air bags, and installing bracing beams
and boards into the cargo container, brought the defendant within the
scope of section 4(b) of state’s the long-arm statute and that the exercise
of jurisdiction was consistent with due process. L’Arciere’s appeal was
eventually certified to the state Supreme Court.177
The Wisconsin long-arm statute, § 801.05(4), authorized the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose act or
omission committed outside of Wisconsin gives rise to an injury within
the state under specified circumstances:
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has
jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to § 801.11
under any of the following circumstances:

...
(4) Local injury; foreign act. In any action claiming injury to person or
property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this
state by the defendant, provided in addition that at the time of the
injury, either:

...
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured
by the defendant were used or consumed within this state in the
ordinary course of trade.178

The critical issue was whether L’Arciere had “processed” products,

176. Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 629 N.W.2d 662 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1079
(2002).
177. Id. at 667.
178. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(4) (West 2012) (emphasis added). It is worth noting that also
the Wisconsin long-arm statute treats the stream-of-commerce as an expression of the effect-test.
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materials, or things that were used or consumed within Wisconsin.179 As
the State Supreme Court phrased it, “The question presented is,
therefore, whether the word ‘process’ means to bring about a physical
transformation upon the products, materials, or things themselves, as
urged by L’Arciere . . . or whether process is a broader term,” i.e., one
that would include the preparation of goods for transit.180 In concluding
that the latter, more inclusive definition was more consistent with the
goals of the long-arm statute, the state high court relied on an earlier
decision by the Seventh Circuit, Nelson by Carson v. Park Industries,
Inc.,181 construing § 801.05(4)(b):
The verb “to process” certainly may refer to the narrower concept of
preparing something in the sense of manufacturing it. However, it also
has the broader definitions of subjecting something to a particular
system of handling to effect a particular result and preparing
something for market or other commercial use by subjecting it to a
process. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language (1963).182

With that broad interpretation as its guide, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
concluded that the loading activities engaged in by L’Arciere fell within
the scope of § 801.05(4)(b) as a form of processing.183 In so ruling the
court rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit construing a virtually
identical Florida statute as pertaining only to the process of
manufacturing and thus excluded activities pertaining to the shipment of
the goods.184 The Wisconsin court explained the differing conclusions
as being the product of different interpretive principles.185 The court
also found that the exercise of jurisdiction over L’Arciere was consistent
with due process, applying Justice Brennan’s pure stream of commerce
model.186
Given the broad interpretation employed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the Wisconsin long-arm statute did not prevent the court from
examining the fundamentals of due process (albeit through the
misdirected lens of the stream of commerce test). The result in the Fifth

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
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Id. at 669.
See generally Nelson by Carson v. Park Indus. Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1124 n.5.
Kopke, 629 N.W.2d at 670.
See generally Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, 634 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1981).
Kopke, 629 N.W.2d at 671.
Id. at 674-75.
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Circuit case was, however, quite different.187 The Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute blocked any consideration of fundamental
due process principles. On the one hand, the interpretation adopted by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to be a bit of a stretch. On the
other hand, it seems unlikely that the Florida legislature intended to draw
the manufacturer-shipper distinction that the language of the statute
suggests. The simple point is this: Whether the “product, material, or
things” were “processed,” has virtually nothing to do with connecting
factors, expectations, or fundamental principles of fairness and justice,
which should have instead engaged the court.
III. PROPOSAL: A FUNDAMENTAL-PRINCIPLES DUE PROCESS STATUTE
With a broader perspective of the subject, this Article posits that a
legislative intervention—at both the state and federal levels—would
better address the topic and significantly reduce current inconsistencies
and confusion, than continuing to rely upon an increasingly disjointed
case-by-case approach. Indeed, immediately after International Shoe,
state and federal legislative bodies might have stepped in and adopted
statutes that articulated the basic ideas contained in that opinion, thus
offering a stable, principled approach to answering many of the issues
that the Court had to later confront on a case-by-case basis, not always
successfully, as the Court itself recently admitted.188
As I noted in the introduction, all statutes are subject to judicial
interpretation and judicial review. Hence, the Supreme Court will have
the final say as to the constitutionally permissible scope of any proposed
statute. It is possible that the Court will insist on enforcing its doctrinal
approach to personal jurisdiction but it is also possible that the guidance
from the statute will assist the Court in redirecting its analysis back to
the fundamental principles of due process.
My statute takes a middle course between an open-ended due
process type statute and the typical tailored long-arm statute. I reject the
due process type because it provides too little guidance and it would
generate the same problems that the Supreme Court has created in
interpreting the Due Process Clause. I also reject the tailored long-arm
statute for the reasons offered in Part III.B.4. This is because tailored

187. See Mallard, 634 F.2d at 241 (explaining that the statutory language could not be read to
give the court jurisdiction in this case).
188. “This Court’s Asahi decision may be responsible in part for that court’s error regarding
the stream of commerce, and this case presents an opportunity to provide greater clarity.” J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
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long-arm statutes incorporate the misguided case-by-case doctrine of due
process and therefore are not premised on a durable standard capable of
application to a wide range of cases. My statute is intended to articulate
precisely such a durable standard without the baggage of the Court’s
mechanistic formulas or the acrobatics that state courts exercise in
interpreting their long-arm statutes.
A. Proposed Statute
My proposed statute, which is addressed to Congress and state
legislatures,189 reads as follows:
Section 1. The district courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over
an individual or entity not a resident of the state in which the court is
located when the individual or entity has engaged in activities in that
state or outside that state that have caused effects therein, when those
in-state activities or in-state effects are such as to give that individual
or entity a reasonable expectation of being sued in that state. A
“reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum” shall take account
of both the quality and quantity of the contacts, including the
relationship or lack thereof between those contacts and the plaintiff’s
claims.
Section 2. The district courts may not decline the exercise of
jurisdiction provided under Section 1 of this Title unless authorized to
do so by Congress.

B. Commentary to the Proposed Statute
1. Section 1
This section is premised on the due process principles of connecting
factors and reasonable expectations arising from those connections. This
standard does not draw any distinction between the traditional and
minimum contacts bases of jurisdiction. Nor does it draw a distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction; nor among the various
subcategories of doctrine developed over the past several decades, e.g.,
purposeful availment, effect test, stream of commerce, etc. Rather, this
Section asks a simple and direct question and, at the same time,
encompasses a wide range of jurisdictional possibilities, all traceable to
the fundamental principles of due process.
189. The text of the statute is directed toward its application in the federal judicial system.
The text, however, could be easily revised to make it applicable in state courts.
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As discussed herein, most of the Supreme Court’s major decisions
on personal jurisdiction could be resolved and explained by reference to
this elegant standard. For example, the activities of the International
Shoe Company in the State of Washington were of such a nature to give
that company reasonable expectation of a suit in the forum based on
those contacts. Similarly, the contractual relationships in McGee and
Burger King were sufficiently connected to the forum state to give the
parties to the contracts a reasonable expectation of suit in the forum on
claims arising from those contacts. Even the decision in Calder can be
explained as premised on the nonresident defendants’ connections with
the forum state, such connections giving rise to a reasonable expectation
of suit in the forum. The Section 1 standard also explains the denial of
jurisdiction in World Wide Volkswagen and Shaffer, where the absence
of meaningful factors connecting the nonresident defendants with the
forum indicated the absence of a reasonable expectation of suit against
them in that forum.190 Section 1 would eliminate tag jurisdiction.191 It
would not overrule Burnham, but it would eliminate a district court’s
authority to exercise the jurisdiction otherwise permitted by Burnham.
Undoubtedly, there is some tension between this standard and some
of the Court’s decisions, at least if those decisions are examined under
the Fourteenth Amendment perspective. This might occur in a federal
forum under the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(1)(A), or in a state forum that has adopted my proposed statute.
Certainly, the results in Hanson, Kulko, and McIntyre can be seen as
inconsistent with the standard described in Section 1. This is because in
those cases the Court insinuated an artificial test between the
fundamental principle and the facts. Thus, in these cases, the personal
jurisdiction analysis was driven by irrelevant questions. Of course, it is
possible that the current Court would insist on a continuation of this
practice, thus rendering Section 1 ineffective and potentially
unconstitutional. But it is also possible that the Court would accept an
invitation from Congress to reconsider its personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence from the more principled perspective provided in Section
1.
With respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal
courts, the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional issue should disappear,
since the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts is constrained by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In other words, the exercise
190.
191.

See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
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of personal jurisdiction here would not present a question of jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), which incorporates
the Fourteenth Amendment, but would under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(1)(C), which vests federal courts with personal
jurisdiction pursuant to a congressionally enacted statute. Under these
circumstances, the constitutionality of any application of Section 1
would look at the connecting factors between the nonresident defendant
and the United States as a whole.
Given the foregoing, it is quite likely that under the proposed
statute a federal court would be able to exercise personal jurisdiction in
cases presenting fact-patterns similar to those in Hanson, Kulko, and
McIntyre. In McIntyre, for example, the foreign manufacturer clearly
had contacts with the United States as a whole, since it targeted the
entire North American market, and those contacts were certainly
sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of suit in the United
States premised on effects of that marketing felt there. Under Section 1,
Justice Ginsburg’s analysis in McIntyre would be unassailable, since the
standard would be, in fact, national contacts as a matter of the Fifth
Amendment due process clause.
Although Section 1 does not expressly reference the traditional
grounds of jurisdiction, as I have explained, most of them are
encompassed by its standard.192 For example, an individual who is
domiciled in the state in which the court is located will be subject to the
jurisdiction in that state since domicile in a state creates a reasonable
expectation of suit there, given both the quality and quantity of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum. In other words, domicile is a
meaningful contact that gives the defendant a reasonable expectation of
suit in the forum.193 Similarly, consent to jurisdiction in a forum
inherently creates a connection with the forum that leads to reasonable
expectation of suit there.
2. Section 2
The purpose of Section 2 is to replace the “unreasonableness” exit
of the personal jurisdiction analysis with a legislatively defined and
carefully circumscribed forum non conveniens doctrine.194 I have
192. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29 & cmt. a (2012) (domicile); id. § 41 & cmts. a & b (place of
incorporation); id. § 32 (consent); id. § 33 (waiver or appearance).
193. See Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of Jurisdictional Rules, 86 TUL. L.
REV. 623 (2012).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
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proposed the adoption of precisely such a forum non conveniens
statute.195 That statute is essentially a companion to my proposed
personal jurisdiction statute. The combined goal of these proposed
statutes is to define the scope of personal jurisdiction and to provide
guidance as to the limited circumstances under which a court may
decline the exercise of an otherwise legitimate exercise of jurisdiction.
*****
The above proposed personal jurisdiction statute fully incorporates
the fundamental principles of due process recognized by the Court in
International Shoe. It also embraces the traditional grounds of
jurisdiction, but only to the extent that those traditional grounds are
consistent with International Shoe’s individual-rights conception of the
due process of law. Moreover, its application requires no mechanistic
formulas, nor any doctrinal tests other than those that focus on the

195. See Simona Grossi, Forum Non Conveniens as a Jurisdictional Doctrine, 75 U. PITT. L.
REV. ___ (2014). The proposed forum non conveniens statute reads as follows:
1. In any civil action of which a district court has original jurisdiction, the district court
may stay or dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens only if:
a. The defendant files a timely motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens, such timeliness to be measured under the standards applicable to a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), but for good cause shown, the court
may extend the period set forth in this Section for the filing a (sic) forum non conveniens motions: and
b. The moving party demonstrates and the district court finds that there is an available alternate forum with jurisdiction over the action and the defendants, that, as a
practical matter, the plaintiff will have access to that forum, that such forum provides a suitable substantive remedy for the claim or claims asserted by the plaintiff,
and that such forum adheres to the fundamental standards of due process; and
c. The district court finds that the available alternate forum provides a substantially
more suitable forum for the adjudication of the claim or action, and that the
maintenance of the claim or action in the district court would impose substantial injustice on the moving party.
2. For good cause shown, the court may extend the period set forth in Section 1a for the
filing a forum non conveniens motion.
3. If the district court finds that the standards in Section 1 have been satisfied, it may stay
or dismiss the claim or action on any condition it deems just. Such conditions may include the defendant’s waiver of any statute of limitation or lack of jurisdiction defense
he might otherwise have in the alternate forum.
4. When granting a motion to dismiss an action on forum non conveniens grounds, the
district court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce its dismissal order and any related stipulations or conditions attached thereto.
5. A court that grants or denies a motion to stay or dismiss an action pursuant to this
statute shall set forth specific findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the
court’s order.
6. An order granting or denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is
immediately appealable. The findings of fact shall be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The conclusions of law shall be reviewed under de novo standard.
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forum-relating connecting factors and the reasonable expectations that
make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
While courts will be required to apply this statute in specific factual
contexts, those applications should not operate as an invitation to create
new doctrine or rewrite the statute, as has occurred with so many state
long-arm statutes. Rather, those applications should provide no more
than exemplars of what a particular court did under a particular set of
facts, consistent with the specific language of the statute. To be sure, the
perceived wisdom of those particular applications may well influence
the direction of statutory interpretation, but the critical question must
always be whether the application respects the fundamental principles of
due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1966, von Mehren and Trautman had identified problems with
the then emerging personal jurisdiction formula that became even more
evident in the years that followed.196 At that time, they predicted that
significant changes were going to occur and that, among those changes,
a less mechanistic and more effective methodology would emerge.197
Instead, under the guidance of the Supreme Court, quite the opposite has
occurred.
The importance of personal jurisdiction cannot be overstated. As
noted earlier, personal jurisdiction is deeply intertwined with the
litigants’ due process rights. Also, the outcome of cases is significantly
influenced, if not entirely determined, by decisions on jurisdiction and
choice of law, with the latter often deeply influenced by the former.
Those who are skeptical of rules might raise questions as to
whether a statute would really solve the issues that the Court’s standards
have thus far not been able to solve. Indeed, even after a statute is
passed, judges would still be the ones who interpret and apply it. The
proposed statute and its underlying ideas and principles, however, would
not generate the same problems that the current personal jurisdiction
judge-made formula is generating because it will carefully guide judges
through a crisp analysis.
Indeed, by endorsing the clear and
straightforward formula of connecting factors and the reasonable
expectations to which those factors can give rise, the proposed statute
reminds courts that the jurisdictional inquiry is a fact-specific analysis
196. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
197. Id.
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and that no more specific doctrinal test is needed to decide when
meaningful connections with the forum state give rise to a reasonable
expectation of being sued there. True, judges might view facts
differently. However, the basic idea is that for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction to be consistent with due process, it should be reasonably
expected by the defendant based on his or her meaningful contacts with
the forum. At least that is the right question to ask.
The proposed personal jurisdiction statute would not be the first
jurisdictional statute to provide clear and effective guidance to federal
courts. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 governing supplemental jurisdiction
can be considered illustrative in this respect. When § 1367 was adopted,
in 1990, courts were confused as to when they could properly exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, for the Court’s earlier opinions198 had left
some questions unanswered.199 Congress decided to intervene by
passing § 1367. Subsections (a) and (c) of that statute adopt a
fundamental principles approach to supplemental jurisdiction that,
through general formula—”claims that are so related . . . that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III”—and general
criteria that a court might consider to “decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction”—gives courts sufficient guidance as to the scope of the
standards, avoiding the need for further doctrinal developments.200 The
guidance that the statute offered under subsections (a) and (c) was
indeed effective, for the Court has not had to revisit the related issues
again. On the other hand, the Court’s intervention was necessary to
clarify the scope of subsection (b) of the same statute,201 which, unlike
the other two provisions, had been framed in the tailored-long-armstatute style. Learning from that experience, the proposed personal
jurisdiction statute mirrors the format of subsections (a) and (c) of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute and as a result provides a durable
standard capable of application across a wide range of cases.

198. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
199. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) & (c) (1990).
201. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
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